It should be noted that Northern Ireland Independence has been mooted by several unionist politicians in the past century and more recently it was recommended by the Ulster Defence Associations political think-tank the Ulster Political Research Group in the 1970`s as a permanent peaceful solution. What follows is an article about Northern Ireland Independence but from an Irish Republican point of view. Perhaps there is some common ground that can be worked on here.

Alan - Webmaster - Ulster-Scots & Irish Unionist Resource

The below was published in "The Blanket" and gives a very interesting
view of a possible future constitutional situation Northern Ireland
may be forced into. It can be viewed at

http://lark.phoblacht.net/independence.html

Yours,

Dave

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INDEPENDENCE FOR NORTHERN IRELAND: WHY AND HOW
Paul A. Fitzsimmons

Sustained international efforts during the past three years at trying
to implement Northern Ireland's grievously flawed Good Friday
Agreement ("GFA") for devolved power-sharing have failed, as the
grievously flawed "Sunningdale" power-sharing effort failed more than
a quarter of a century ago.

Could anyone justly -- or even rationally -- urge: "Just give us
another decade or two and we promise to get a 'Sunningdale Mark III'
up and running"?

Similarly, a "let's just wait for reunion" call, if heeded, would
inevitably mean another lost generation, or more, for both
communities in the North.

Yet, compounding Northern Ireland's socio-political tragedy, many in
Britain, Ireland and elsewhere presume that no other way forward
exists, even in theory, to resolve "the Troubles." That presumption
is in error: negotiated independence might yet be possible and might
possibly suffice.

Before inertia slides Northern Ireland back into another generation
of unhappy direct rule, the pervasive - and perhaps incorrect -
assumption that independence could not work or would not be
acceptable needs to be examined and tested vigorously. Six key
aspects of fair and workable independence are evident.

First, Britain and the Republic of Ireland could each allow dual
citizenship for any in Northern Ireland - and any of their progeny -
so desiring it.

Second, a form of government could be constructed which, unlike the
North's pre-1973 "Stormont" government, would afford Northern
Ireland's Catholic population (now over 40 per cent) a genuine
opportunity for political participation. (Eminently clear, for
example, is that merely offering guaranteed participation
in "watchdog committees" within some new parliament would not be
enough.)

Third, Britain, perhaps with the assistance of others, could ensure
that a new Northern Ireland state would remain financially viable
through long-term continuation of economic subventions such as the
North has received for many decades as a part of the UK. (Such
subventions - it should be remembered -would unquestionably continue,
even without independence, for many decades.)

Fourth, constitutionally established individual and civic rights
would be necessary.

Fifth, because adjusting the Irish border could only be
counterproductive, independence would have to include all of Northern
Ireland's present territory.

Sixth, while Britain required only a bare majority of affirmative
votes for the GFA's approval, a plan as dramatically different as
negotiated independence would likely require at least two-thirds
support at the polls to warrant implementation. At that level, either
main community could assuredly "veto" this effort.

Leading members of each of the largest political parties in Northern
Ireland-Unionist, Nationalist, Republican, Loyalist, and otherwise -
have given independence quiet consideration during the past quarter
century, albeit most often merely as a fallback constitutional
position. In the 1970s and 1980s, the most affirmative consideration
of it came mainly from three men now late of this world - Loyalist
John McMichael, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Sean MacBride (on behalf
of the Provisional IRA), and Belfast academic/ author/activist Dr.
Stanley Worrell - as well as from former British Prime Minister James
Callaghan.

Yet, the "logistical" viability of Northern Ireland's independence
has long been in doubt (often, it must be said, because various "big
thinkers" wrongly assume that challenging logistical problems in this
regard are completely insoluble). Moreover, choosing independence
would certainly require very plain, very difficult political
sacrifices from her Catholic and Protestant communities.

However, an independence proposal would be straightforward and honest
(whereas the GFA was described, by supporters from both communities,
as "contradictory" and "a flagrant subterfuge").

Just possibly, if presented with an opportunity for fair and workable
independence, the bulk of the North's Protestants and Catholics might
decide to sacrifice political ties that they respectively cherish
(continued union with Britain or future reunion with the Irish
Republic) in order to reach an accommodation precluding a result that
they would respectively dislike or despise (future reunion or
continued union). An April 1997 Belfast Telegraph/Queen's University
of Belfast opinion poll showed that roughly half of each of Northern
Ireland's Protestant and Catholic communities would at
least "tolerate" a settlement involving independence; that poll was
taken without any actual independence plan to evaluate ... and before
this second failure at "power-sharing."

How might this potentiality best be examined? Independence, if it
ever happened, would have to be the product of joint efforts by the
British and Irish governments later approved by a super-majority
(probably between 66 and 75 percent) of those voting in an
independence plebiscite in Northern Ireland. Specifically, the
following implementation steps might well be followed:

1. The British and Irish governments would expressly ask Northern
Irelanders to encourage their respective political representatives to
take part in a transparent constitutional convention presided over by
outside constitutional experts.

2. After a constitutional and financial package for independence has
been approved by Britain, the Republic, and the EU, and after
adequate time for public discussion, the British government would
hold a "simple majority" plebiscite in Northern Ireland on the
following 'test-drive' issue: "Do you want to see a 'shadow' election
held to establish who would hold office under this 'ready-to-wear'
scheme if that scheme were later approved in a 'super-majority'
plebiscite?"

3. If the majority did not want to take that 'test-drive,' negotiated
independence would be well proven to be inadequate and rightly
abandoned.

4. If the 'shadow' election proposal did receive majority support,
shadow officials would then be chosen, but those officials would have
few powers. Assuming that the proposed constitutional government were
in the form of a 'presidential' system of government, the elected
shadow president and shadow legislators would be empowered to select,
in accordance with that system, an executive cabinet and members of
the judiciary. The only other power they'd have would be to convene
themselves in their shadow positions; at least in theory, they might
convene to discuss whether to recommend voter approval of the
ultimate 'super-majority' plebiscite on the issue of Northern
Ireland's negotiated independence.

5. After some appropriate period of time following an
approved 'shadow' election, the 'super-majority' plebiscite would be
held. Rejection thereof would entail abandonment of an 'independence'
approach. Acceptance thereof would trigger a transition period,
likely to be subject to a final 'condition precedent' of
independently approved 'decommissioning,' whereupon the shadow
members (executive, judicial, and legislative) of the government
would be certified as official.

A catch-22 exists, though: independence might ultimately prove to be
an acceptable and equitable answer, but few in Northern Ireland will
publicly request even that it be examined (often because of pragmatic
and philosophical constraints of their own), and Britain is surely
loath to undertake that effort without such requests.

However, unlike in the wake of 1974's "Sunningdale" failure, in place
today is a British administration with not only the demonstrated
capacity for historic vision but also the parliamentary strength to
attempt a more radical approach in a situation where less radical
approaches have invariably proven inadequate.

Fair and workable independence can happen in one circumstance only:
if that option is made logistically and financially possible through
the wise, brave, and generous support of the British and Irish
governments. Thus, the key question - unanswered by recent events in
Northern Ireland - is: "Could the British and Irish governments
actually be wise, brave, and generous?"

John Stuart Mill rightly observed in his On Liberty: "There is the
greatest difference between presuming an opinion to be true, because,
with every opportunity for contesting it, it has not been refuted,
and assuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting its
refutation." That sage observation notwithstanding, those who today
oppose independence too often dogmatically postulate its
unworkability as grounds for asserting that independence shouldn't
even be formally examined, even in the absence of any other effort
towards establishing democracy in that region.

Any form of continued "direct rule" of Northern Ireland is morally
inferior to fair, workable, and acceptable democracy there. While the
North's voters must have the final say, the time is at hand for the
first-ever formal study of Northern Ireland's possible negotiated
independence.

Paul A. Fitzsimmons